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This paper constructs a quantitative lifecycle model with uninsurable labor income and
aggregate housing return risk to assess how Korean households make saving and portfolio
allocation decisions. The model incorporates the special roles housing plays in the portfolio
of households: collateral, a source of service °ows, as well as a source of potential capital
gains or losses. In the model, a household ¯rst makes the decision whether to rent or to buy
a house and then chooses the housing value. The model adds to existing models of wealth
accumulation some unique institutional features present in Korea, namely the rental system
(`chonsae') and the lack of a mortgage system. When the model is calibrated to match
the Korean economy, several key features of the data are better able to be reproduced. The
paper also analyzes the role of institutional features by comparing several alternative housing
market arrangements and the introduction of a pay-as-you-go social security system to assess
their impact on wealth accumulation, portfolio choices, and the pattern of homeownership.
I ¯nd that expanding the mortgage system signi¯cantly increases the homeownership ratio,
while alternative rental arrangements have mixed e®ects on the homeownership ratio. All
of the alternative market arrangements raise the fraction of household wealth invested into
housing assets. I also ¯nd that the introduction of social security system will lower the overall
savings in Korea by approximately 10% and lower the homeownership ratio by 6 percentage
points.
JEL classi¯cation : D91, E21, H31, R21
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In this paper, I examine the Korean household's wealth accumulation and asset portfolio choices
over the life cycle. Empirical studies about household portfolios have been undertaken in some
developed countries, but little attention has been paid to developing countries mainly due to
the lack of quality data. I use the recent Korea Labor Income Panel Study (KLIPS) to examine
how average Korean households accumulate their wealth over the life cycle. I then make a
cross-country reference in order to highlight the di®erences in the pro¯le of various assets in the
aggregate as well as over the age-groups. This enables me to pay close attention to the points
that are speci¯c to Korea.
Housing is the most important form of wealth in Korea. According to the KLIPS data, while
approximately 60% of households are homeowners, housing assets make up close to 50% of total
assets held by all households. The share of ¯nancial assets, on the other hand, is around 25%.
This is a signi¯cant departure from the United States, where the homeownership ratio is around
68% and the shares of housing and ¯nancial assets are approximately 30% and 37%, respectively.
Thus, despite a lower homeownership ratio in Korea, for those who are homeowners, housing
becomes the most predominant source of wealth. This also indicates that the decision to purchase
a house has important implications for the portfolio composition of a Korean household over the
life cycle, as housing not only provides a °ow of service for consumption but also can be used
as a source of investment.
Unique to the Korean economy is the existence of a `chonsae' system, a rental market system
in which a tenant pays a deposit upfront (usually 40-80% of the property value) with no addi-
tional periodic rent payments, and receives the nominal value of the deposit from the landlord
upon maturation. Given this structure of the chonsae system, renters in Korea have a proportion
of their assets indirectly tied up to housing with zero nominal returns. This contrasts sharply
with the situation in the United States, where renters do not own any assets related to housing
and therefore are able to diversify their ¯nancial portfolio. Another unique aspect is the lack
of an a®ordable mortgage system, which re°ects the under-developed nature of the ¯nancial
sector in Korea. For instance, Lam (2002) reports the average mortgage to GDP ratio in Ko-
rea between 1996 and 2000 to be around 11%, whereas the corresponding ¯gure in the United
States was approximately 55%. Also, the average loan-to-value ratio1 during the same period
was 28% in Korea, as opposed to around 80% in the United States. A full-scale government-
endorsed mortgage system was only introduced in 2004, prior to which such a system was almost
non-existent.
1Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is de¯ned as the ratio of the fair market value of an asset to the value of the loan
that will ¯nance the purchase.
1I set up a partial equilibrium lifecycle model allowing for these speci¯c housing features in
Korea and I calibrate it to match wealth accumulation and portfolio choice over the life cycle. In
the model, housing plays multiple roles in the economy as not only a source of direct consumption
but also as an investment with potential for capital gains and collateral. The results from the
calibrated model can quantitatively explain some empirical ¯ndings on the pro¯le of wealth and
homeownership in the aggregate as well as over the life cycle.
In addition, I assess the roles played by the institutional features of the mortgage market
and the rental market arrangement, and ask how much they can individually and jointly account
for the observed pattern of the wealth accumulation and portfolio composition in Korea. For
the mortgage market, an expansion of the current mortgage system is represented by a higher
loan-to-value ratio. Expanding the current mortgage system lowers the overall level of wealth
accumulation in the economy, while increasing the homeownership ratio and the fraction of
wealth invested into housing assets. Wider availability of mortgage loans weakens the saving
motives since households, especially younger ones, save primarily to purchase a house. However,
as it becomes easier for households to purchase a house, the fraction of wealth invested into
housing and the overall homeownership increase. For reasonable parameter values, I ¯nd that
increasing the loan-to-value ratio to 70% will cause a 3% decrease in the aggregate net worth, a
11 percentage point increase in the homeownership ratio, and a 14 percentage point increase in
the fraction of wealth invested into housing asset.
Next, the rental arrangement in the benchmark model is altered such that in lieu of a lump-
sum deposit, households pay periodic rental payment which is assumed to be a fraction of the
house value. The annual rental cost ranges from 2% to 6% of the value of the house. For lower
rental cost, this results in a decrease in the overall level of wealth accumulation as well as a
lower homeownership ratio, since renting becomes a cheaper alternative to homeownership and
lowers the need for savings geared towards housing purchase. For the annual rental cost of 2%,
the aggregate net worth and the homeownership ratio decline by 9% and 7 percentage points,
respectively. In addition, the fraction of wealth in housing assets falls by 4 percentage points.
On the other hand, for higher rental cost parameter values, the overall net worth, the fraction of
wealth invested into housing assets, and the homeownership ratio increase. For the annual rental
cost of 6%, the overall net worth increases by 3%, while the fraction of wealth held in housing
assets and the overall homeownership ratio increase by 5 and 7 percentage points, respectively.
When the mortgage system and the rental arrangement are jointly modi¯ed, the overall level
of wealth accumulation declines by 2% to 10%, depending on the rental cost. On the other
hand, the experiment results in an increase in the homeownership ratio by 4 to 15 percentage
points, and an increase in the share of wealth held in housing assets by 10 to 17 percentage
2points. The decrease in the overall net worth is due to wider availability of mortgage loans or
cheaper rental cost. Looking at di®erent age groups, expanding the mortgage system mainly
targets younger households, whereas di®erent rental arrangement have relatively larger impact
on older households as they decide whether to remain homeowners or become renters.
Finally, I use the model to analyze the quantitative e®ects of introducing a pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) social security system upon the pattern of wealth accumulation and portfolio choice over
the life cycle. The social security experiment shows that the overall level of wealth also declines,
since the availability of social security bene¯ts after retirement weakens the saving motives of
households during their working ages. Lowering the level of wealth accumulation has implications
for the households' housing purchase, as less households can a®ord to purchase owner-occupied
housing. In contrast to expanding the mortgage system, the social security system lowers the
overall homeownership ratio as well. The impact of social security on the composition of wealth
is weak, since the e®ects of lower wealth accumulation and lower homeownership o®set each
other. The quantitative e®ect of a PAYG social security system is a 10% reduction in the
aggregate net worth and a 6 percentage point decline in the homeownership ratio.
This paper builds on the emerging literature that document household portfolio allocation2.
With a few papers allowing for housing in models of portfolio choice, the role of housing wealth
has received greater attention due to its unique role: people can borrow against housing; housing
is indivisible and relatively illiquid (buying and selling entail signi¯cant liquidation costs); and
housing not only provides a °ow of real bene¯ts to the owner as a consumption good, but also,
acts as an investment good that provides potential for capital gains or losses. Grossman and
Laroque (1990), using an in¯nite horizon model, are the ¯rst to analyze housing in the portfolio
allocation in the presence of adjustment costs. D¶ ³az and Luengo-Prado (2002) and Gruber and
Martin (2003) also use a standard in¯nite horizon model to study the role of durable goods and
collateral credit in accounting for wealth inequality and the level of precautionary savings in
the United States. Cocco (2004) speci¯es the housing price risk to study the asset allocation
decision in the presence of housing. Some papers explicitly include housing in the context of a
general equilibrium lifecycle framework. For example, Chen (2004) investigates the implications
of privatizing social security system, while Yang (2005) matches the pro¯le of housing in the
United States. Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2004) use a similar framework to examine
the recent changes in the US homeownership ratio. Other important works include, among many
others, Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2001), Flavin and Yamashita (2002), and Campbell
and Cocco (2003). Additionally, an alternative to the housing market is that people can rent
instead of purchasing a house. In the case of renting, renters receive a similar °ow of services,
2A comprehensive review of the literature is provided by McCarthy (2004).
3although somewhat less than from their own house, and are not subject to capital gains or losses.
Platania and Schlagenhauf (2000), Ortalo-Magn¶ e and Rady (2003), Hu (2003), Yao and Zhang
(2003), Miles, · Cern¶ y and Schmidt (2004), Li and Yao (2005) all explicitly incorporate the rental
versus homeownership decision into their models.
In general, models of housing have made predictions closer to what have been observed empir-
ically in areas such as wealth distribution, household portfolio allocations, and tenure decisions;
however, these models have been calibrated mostly to the United States. It would be interesting
to evaluate the predictions of these models on other economies while incorporating their unique
features. This will indirectly help to examine the role of these features in accounting for the
di®erences in wealth accumulation and portfolio choice across countries. This paper makes a
¯rst attempt to ¯ll this void and extends beyond the literature by o®ering distinct contributions
in both empirical and theoretical aspects. First, the paper conducts an empirical study of wealth
in Korean households from the KLIPS data and points out some stylized facts in the average
wealth portfolio as well as the cross-section pro¯le of various assets and homeownership ratios by
age groups. It highlights the similarities and di®erences in the pattern of wealth accumulation
and portfolio choice with those shown in the United States and other countries. Theoretically,
the model framework of this paper is closest in spirit to Miles, · Cern¶ y and Schmidt (2004). They
also set up a calibrated model in the context of uninsurable labor income and uncertainties in
housing price to simulate the housing and portfolio choice of Japanese households and study the
impact of changes in the social security regimes and demography. However, this paper explores
several other distinct aspects. First, my model set-up explicitly incorporates the chonsae system
in the Korean housing market, which is not modelled in Miles, · Cern¶ y and Schmidt (2004). Sec-
ond, the paper looks at the mortgage institutions in Korea and explores the joint implications
of the speci¯c rental choices and mortgage institutions faced by Korean households. The model
is then calibrated to the Korean economy, providing the groundwork for various policy analyses.
The paper then highlights the role of institutional factors by altering the market institutions
individually and jointly, and examine the impact on the pro¯le of wealth, wealth composition,
and homeownership.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical ¯ndings
and stylized facts from the analysis of the KLIPS data and documents some features of wealth
accumulation and portfolio changes for average Korean households. Section 3 describes the cal-
ibrated lifecycle model framework. Section 4 outlines the calibration and the parametrization of
the model. In Section 5, I present the results from the benchmark simulation, and quantitatively
assess the roles played by the housing market institutions in Korea as well as some implications
of introducing a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system. Section 6 conducts a sensitivity
4analysis, and brief concluding remarks are provided in Section 7. The appendix presents the
model set up for an alternative rental arrangement, algorithms for the computation, and the
¯gures from the sensitivity analysis.
2 Data and Empirical Evidence
2.1 Average Wealth Portfolio
In this study, I use the Korean Labor Income Panel Study (KLIPS) from 1998 to 2002. It is a
socio-demographic panel study which includes data about household income and wealth. In the
wealth category, the KLIPS survey asks households about various types of assets and liabilities.
I group assets into primary housing (\House"), ¯nancial assets, and other non-¯nancial assets
excluding owner-occupied housing such as secondary home, land, and rental real estate (\Other
non-¯nancial"). Within the ¯nancial assets category, I closely examine di®erent ¯nancial assets,
such as rent deposit, time deposits (checking and savings account), stocks and bonds, and life
insurance. A rent deposit, or `chonsae' deposit, is a lump-sum deposit in lieu of periodic rental
payments that is unique to Korea. Since renters pay an upfront deposit at the beginning of the
contract and receive the exact nominal amount back at the end of the contract, a chonsae is
considered a ¯nancial instrument with a zero nominal interest rate3. I also look at outstanding
¯nancial liabilities. Net worth is de¯ned as the di®erence between total assets and total ¯nancial
liabilities. Table 1 below summarizes the wealth holdings of the average household for each asset
type from the 2001-2002 KLIPS data. For reference, the table also shows the average wealth
holdings in the United States compiled by Kennickell (2003), which uses the 1995 Survey of
Consumer Finances.
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Average Wealth - Korea vs. United States
Korea United States
Total asset(normalized by average income) 5.247 5.560
- House 2.580 1.670
- Financial asset 1.315 2.041
¦ Rent deposit 0.613 -
¦ Deposits 0.450 0.399
¦ Stock & Bond 0.074 0.852
¦ Insurance 0.089 0.147
¦ Others 0.089 0.643
- Other non-¯nancial 1.352 1.849
Total liabilities 0.816 0.813
Net Worth 4.431 4.747
3The survey also asks landlords whether or not they have received the chonsae deposit. Since this is considered
part of the ¯nancial liabilities, there is no double counting of ¯nancial assets in the aggregate.
5For a comparison of wealth composition, I present the share of di®erent assets as well as the
di®erent components of ¯nancial assets. Also, an additional summary of statistics for Korea by
Lee and Lee (2001) is provided, which uses a di®erent panel study (Korean Household Panel
Study) for 1998. This comparison is shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2. Wealth Portfolio Comparison - Korea vs. United States
Korea (1998) United States (1995) Korea (2001-02)
Total Asset 100.0 100.0 100.0
Financial 19.8 36.7 25.1
Deposit 8.1 7.2 8.6
Stock 0.7 12.5 1.4 y
Bond 0.3 2.8 -
Insurance 3.0 2.6 1.7
Other z 7.8 11.6 13.4
Non-¯nancial 80.2 63.3 74.9
Owned house 51.4 30.0 49.2
Other 28.8 33.3 x 25.7
Total Liabilities 10.0 14.6 16.0
y Stocks and bonds are combined under the KLIPS survey.
z Mainly rent deposits in Korea and pension fund in the US, respectively.
x Out of other non-¯nancial assets, business equity (18%) is the main component.
From the cross-country comparison of wealth portfolio, I summarize some idiosyncracies of
the Korean households' wealth portfolio when compared to that of the US households.
1. Housing asset is the most important asset in Korea (around 50% of the total asset);
whereas, ¯nancial asset is the major asset in the United States (37% of total asset). In fact,
as a proportion of their total asset, Korean households have a relatively smaller proportion
(around 25%) of assets in ¯nancial assets in contrast to their American counterparts.
2. Among di®erent types of ¯nancial assets, Americans invest primarily in stocks followed by
pension funds. However, in Korea, the most common form of ¯nancial asset is a deposit,
either in the form of a rent deposits or a time deposit, such as a savings account. In fact,
the fraction of ¯nancial assets invested in stocks and bonds is only 6% in Korea, whereas
in the US, the fraction of ¯nancial assets held in stocks alone stands at 35%. As rent
deposits take almost 45% of total ¯nancial assets in Korea, this implies that renters have
a large share of their ¯nancial assets indirectly tied up to housing. This contrasts sharply
with the situation in the United States, where renters do not own any assets related to
housing and therefore are able to diversify their ¯nancial portfolio.
The characteristics of the Korean households' wealth portfolio are emphasized further by
looking at similar works conducted for other countries. Banks, Blundell and Smith (2002)
6document the wealth portfolio in the United Kingdom using the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS), and reports that an average UK household holds 60%4 of total household wealth in
home equity. As for types of ¯nancial assets, the BHPS reports a 35% share for stocks and
mutual funds. Iwaisako (2003) studies household portfolios in Japan and shows that ¯nancial
assets comprise 31% of the total asset. The rest is invested into housing or other real estate
assets. Looking into the shares of di®erent types of ¯nancial assets, time deposits make up 46%
of total ¯nancial assets followed by life insurance at 41%. The share of stocks and bonds is
only around 8% of total ¯nancial assets. The cases of the United Kingdom and Japan indicate
some similarities in the composition of the wealth portfolio in Korean, Japanese, and British
households in contrast to American households. Excluding the United States, not only is housing
(or home equity) the most important investment, but also the portfolio composition of the
¯nancial assets is more risk-averse, with only a small fraction invested in risky assets such as
stocks.
One issue is how well the household survey of wealth matches the aggregate measures. On
top of the usual misreporting problem, the KLIPS data does not over-sample the wealthy, and,
thus, gross wealth estimated from the survey is likely to under-represent the aggregate wealth of
the economy. Regarding the composition of wealth, since the wealthy tend to hold more of their
wealth in ¯nancial assets other than housing, the relative share of ¯nancial assets is expected to
be higher in the aggregate economy than in the KLIPS data. Further study is needed to bridge
the gap between the two di®erent data sources.
2.2 Wealth Portfolio by Age Cross-Section
In addition to the summary statistics of the wealth portfolio, I examine the age-related pattern
of wealth accumulation and portfolio choice in this section. The level of household wealth and
the composition of the wealth portfolio strongly vary by age. Typically, young households do
not invest in risky assets. Most live in rental housing and are saving to buy a house. This is
more prominent in Korea since young households are not eligible to receive mortgage loans and,
thus, are forced to live in rental housing. Once they accumulate enough savings to buy a house,
they then start investing in risky assets. In Korea, investment in risky assets takes the form of
housing and other non-¯nancial assets, not ¯nancial assets, such as stocks, as shown in the US.
Older age families seem to sell their risky assets and shift their portfolios into safer assets. Some
older age households move in with their children, which involves signi¯cant inter-vivos transfers.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the average accumulation of di®erent types of wealth, as well as
4The British Household Panel Survey presents both upper and lower bound estimates. This ¯gure is the
average.
7their relative shares for di®erent age groups, taken from cross-sectional series of the KLIPS data.




















































Figure 2.2 W ealth Composition Over
Cross-Section (Korea)
The main features of the level of wealth and the wealth portfolio are summarized as follows:
1. Both housing and other non-¯nancial assets show a hump-shaped pattern over the age
groups, which is similar to the pro¯le of the net worth. The pro¯le of the net worth,
housing, and other non-¯nancial assets all reach their peaks between the 45 to 60 age
groups. On the other hand, the ¯nancial net worth shows an early peak, but remains low
and constant after the late thirties age group.
2. In terms of the wealth composition, ¯nancial net worth is the most important type of
wealth for younger households in the twenties and early thirties, but afterwards its share
declines and stays below 10% for age groups older than 45.
3. Housing becomes the dominant asset type after the late thirties age group. The share of
housing in total wealth increases with age and stays almost constant until the early sixties.
In the latter part of the life cycle, housing share increases even further, reaching 80% of
total net worth in the last period. This poses a question as to how retired households
¯nance their consumption at this stage of the life cycle.
4. The share of real estate assets also increases rapidly in age groups until late forties, stays
constant until the early seventies and declines rapidly afterwards.
Finding corresponding ¯gures for a cross-country comparison was not easy. For the United
States, Yang (2005) uses the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to estimate the age pro¯le of
































Figure 2.3 Age-pro¯le of Wealth Composition (United States)
From the cross-country comparison, we see a di®erent composition of wealth over di®erent
age groups for the United States in contrast to Korea. First of all, for the US households
aged less than forty ¯ve, housing wealth is the most important form of wealth, but its share
declines rapidly afterwards as more wealth is held in the form of ¯nancial wealth. Additionally,
the distribution of wealth in ¯nancial and housing wealth in the United States is more evenly
allocated for households below the age of 40 years. For age groups over 60 years, however,
average households hold approximately 70% of wealth in ¯nancial wealth. This marks a sharp
contrast to Korea, where the importance of housing in the portfolio increases over age groups
and vice versa for ¯nancial net worth5.
Not only is there a di®erence in the wealth portfolio, but there is also a di®erence in the
amount of net worth held by di®erent age groups. The average amount of net worth held by
US households under the age of 40 years is around 39% of the average net worth held by all
households. In Korea, on the other hand, the fraction is almost 70%.
2.3 Homeownership Ratio
Since owner-occupied housing is the most important part of household wealth in Korea, the
decision to buy a house or to rent has a signi¯cant implication on the wealth portfolio. Thus,
it is important to take a closer look at how the distribution of owner-occupied housing varies
by age. Figure 2.4 below shows the average fraction of households in the KLIPS data who
are homeowners, or homeownership ratio, determined by the age of the head of the household
5Studies from other countries show di®erent patterns. In the United Kingdom, for households aged less than
forty, housing is the most important form of wealth, but its share declines steadily over the life cycle. However,
housing still remains the predominant form of wealth. In Japan, the share of housing assets in total gross wealth
increases with age and stays relatively constant after the mid-¯fties. Conditional on homeownership, real estate
(including owner-occupied housing) accounts for about 70 to 90 percent of households' total assets.
















United States (Li & Yao, 2004)
Korea (KLIPS, 2001-2002)
Figure 2.4 Homeownership Over Cross-Section (Korea vs. United States)
The average homeownership ratio was around 60%, which is higher than other studies have
shown for Korea6. However, compared to other countries, the homeownership ratio in Korea
is low. For example, in the United States and the United Kingdom, the average ratios are
65% (PSID, 1997)7 and 67% (BHPS 1999), respectively. Looking at the age-related pattern,
greater than half of the households aged less than 40 years do not own their housing. The low
homeownership ratio in the early stages of life cycle can be somewhat explained by the lack of
long-term mortgage loans and the unusually high down payment ratio, which ranges between
70 to 80 percent in Korea. The lack of long-term mortgage loans makes the time needed for
young households to purchase a house longer. A comparison of homeownership ratio for di®erent
age groups in Korea and the United States shows a wider gap for younger households than for
older households. For example, in the age groups 30-35 years, the gap was 15 percentage points,
while the corresponding number was 3 percentage points on average for age groups 50 years or
higher. In the meantime, young households have no option but to live in rental housing under
the `chonsae' system, where they pay huge rental deposits, or to stay with their parents. The
homeownership ratio increases with age until the early seventies, after which households either
sell their house or move in with their children. This explains the decline in the homeownership
ratio in the age groups of 70 years or higher.
2.3.1 Chonsae System
As mentioned earlier, the chonsae (or `chonsei') is a rental market system in Korea in which a
tenant pays an upfront deposit (usually 40-80% of the property value) upon contract, with no
6In another study by Lee and Lee (2001), the homeownership ratio was around 55%.
7The homeownership ratio in the United States was stable around 65% until mid 1990s, and has steadily
increased to around 68%.
10additional periodic rent payments. The tenant also receives the nominal value of the deposit
from the landlord upon expiration of the contract, which typically lasts two years. Landlords
can earn interest income from the deposit or use the deposit for other investment purposes. The
current legal system o®ers tenant protection in case the landlord does not return the deposit.
According to Ambrose and Kim (2003), the wide prevalence of the chonsae system is partly
attributed to the underdeveloped ¯nancial sector and heavy government intervention during
the period of high growth in Korea. Due to low government-led interest rates for business
¯rms, banks demanded high interest rates for consumer credit and housing ¯nance. Under
this circumstance, the chonsae system provided means for credit demand for landlords while
providing a®ordable housing options for renters who didn't have enough cash to purchase a
house. The chonsae contract system is more widespread in large cities where housing is more
expensive. An estimate by Cho (2005) indicates that, as of 2003, the aggregate chonsae deposit
is around 40% of GDP, or 80% of total equity value in Korea.
2.4 Financial Portfolio Diversi¯cation
Empirical studies show that even in developed countries the degree of portfolio diversi¯cation is
very poor. This is true in Korea as well, where most households have the majority of ¯nancial
assets in one or two types of ¯nancial assets. Figure 2.5 shows the composition of the ¯nancial
portfolio cross sectional by age. I broadly categorized ¯nancial assets into chonsae deposit, life
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Figure 2.5 Financial Asset Portfolio Over Cross-Section (Korea)
First of all, the ¯nancial portfolio is poorly diversi¯ed. Throughout life, the ¯nancial portfolio
is very simple, with the majority of people holding most of their ¯nancial asset in one or two
8As life insurance companies guarantee principal plus certain ¯xed interest upon maturity in addition to
providing insurance service, life insurance is considered to be a ¯nancial asset.
11types of ¯nancial assets. The most commonly held ¯nancial assets are rent deposit and time
deposit. Second, looking at the portfolio by age, rent deposit is the most important source of
¯nancial asset for households less than 50 and older than 75 years. Especially, for households
aged less than 40 and older than 75, more than 50% of ¯nancial assets are held in the form of
a rent deposit. The share of rent deposit shows a U-shaped pattern over the age groups, which,
not surprisingly, is inversely related to the homeownership ratio shown in Figure 2.4. Third,
for households aged between 50 and 75 years, time deposits become the main type of ¯nancial
asset. The pro¯le of the time deposit share shows a hump-shaped pattern over the age groups.
Finally, investment in risky stocks and bonds are very low in general, and the pro¯le shows a
weakly hump-shaped pattern over the age groups.
2.5 Rates of Return on Assets
As mentioned earlier, housing acts as an investment good providing the potential for capital gains
or losses. Since housing has an important share in household wealth in Korea, it is important to
take the rate of return on housing and compare it with the returns from other ¯nancial assets.
Figure 2.6 shows the time series of the annual real rate of returns from housing versus real
















Real Interest Rate (mean = 4.1%)
Figure 2.6 Real Rates of Return (Housing vs. Financial Asset) (Korea)
The average rate of return from housing is almost twice the average real interest rate. Even
if the rate of housing depreciation is included, the rate of return from housing would still be
higher than the average interest rate. Historically, except for the early and mid 1990s, housing
returns have been more volatile than the real interest rate. Shocks to housing returns seem to
swing above and below trends for sustained periods, indicating a high persistence. The bubble
in the end of 1980s was followed by a period of relative stability. The big bust in housing prices
9The nominal interest rate comes from the yield rate on 3-year corporate bonds compiled by the Bank of Korea,
and the nominal returns from housing were calculated using the Monthly House Prices index from Kookmin Bank.
12came during the Financial Crisis in 1997, followed by a period of high returns. These features
indicate that housing is a risky investment with relatively high returns in Korea.
3 Benchmark Model
A simple and parsimonious ¯nite-horizon lifecycle model will be set up to calibrate the wealth
accumulation and portfolio choice of the average Korean households, so that the model predic-
tions match some key features of the data shown in the previous section. The model takes a
partial equilibrium framework, as the housing returns are exogenously given in the model. I
allow for the following features of the housing:
² housing tenure choice, since people can decide to rent as an alternative to buying a house,
² stochastic rates of return for the housing assets, which o®er high but volatile returns (in
contrast to risk free ¯nancial assets represented by time deposits),
² and the ability to use housing as collateral
Once the model is set up, it will provide useful grounds for various policy experiments such
as the introduction of mortgage loans or di®erent tax policies. This will be introduced in the
next section.
For simplicity, real estate assets were included in the category of ¯nancial assets. Thus the
model will only concentrate on the choice between housing versus non-housing (or ¯nancial)
assets. Real estate could be used as a part of an individual business or could be rented out to
others. One way to put it into the model is shown in Platania and Schlagenhauf (2001), which
introduces a rental agency that collects rent and uses it for maintaining the quality of the rental
housing. However, for my analysis, I do not explicitly incorporate real estate assets into my
model.
3.1 Demography
Each model period is calibrated to correspond to ¯ve years. Agents or households, which will
be considered as an equivalent concept, actively enter into working life at 20 (denoted as j = 1
in the model)10 and live until 80 (denoted as J = 13), when he/she dies for certain. All agents
enter their working life as renters with zero ¯nancial and housing asset. They work and receive
earnings until 60, the age of mandatory retirement. Following each period, agents face a positive
probability of dying. This is denoted by sj which is the exogenously given survival probability at
10Age is indexed with subscript j and time is indexed with subscript t.
13age j+1 conditional on being alive at age j. The unconditional survival probability for an agent
aged j is the given by
j Q
t=1
st. Since death is certain after age J, sJ = 0. Upon death, household's
net worth is seized away by the government and re-distributed to households aged between 20
and 60 as transfers11. For simplicity there is no population growth nor fertility choice.
3.2 Preferences
Agents derive utility from consumption of nondurable goods, c, and from the °ow of service from
housing stock, h, as well as from bequests, b, left upon death. The service °ow from housing
is proportional to the housing stock. Following the set up by Ortalo-Magn¶ e and Rady (1998),
the utility derived from housing is made higher for a homeowner than for a renter12. That is,
renters will only derive a fraction ¸ < 1 of utility than does a homeowner who has the same




























Here, nj is the exogenously given average e®ective family size adjusted by the adult equivalence
scale, as measured by Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2001). The parameter ! measures
the relative importance of housing service in relation to the non-durable goods consumption,
and ° is the relative risk aversion parameter. I is an indicator function denoting whether the
household is a homeowner or a renter in the given period. As for the utility derived from leaving








11One way to interpret this redistribution is to consider it as the sum of inter-vivos transfers and bequests.
12Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) explain in detail about the externalities of homeownership over renting in addition
to various tax bene¯ts such as home mortgage interest deductions and tax deductions on the capital gains from
selling the house.
14The term '1 re°ects the parent's concern about leaving bequests to children, while '2 measures
the extent to which bequests are luxury goods. This is a simpler form of introducing altruism.
It abstracts from parents caring about the consumption of their children, which will result in a
strategic interaction between parents and children. The remaining bequests are seized by the
government and equally redistributed to all people between the ages of twenty and sixty. Finally,















where s0 = 1.
3.3 Income Process
During each period prior to mandatory retirement at sixty (j = 9), households receive labor
income denoted as yjt, which is a product of the age-dependent deterministic income path,
f(j), and the stochastic component, ºt. The idiosyncratic shock logºt follows a ¯rst-order
autoregressive process (AR(1)) as follows:
logºt = ½y logºt¡1 + ²yt (4)
²yt » N(0;¾2
²y)
The stochastic process is assumed to be identical across households and follows a ¯nite-state
Markov process, which is characterized by the transition function ¦(´0j´) where ´ 2 E =
f´1;:::;´Ng. The deterministic income path is calibrated to re°ect the average lifetime income
pro¯le from the KLIPS data. Upon retirement, individuals no longer receive income in the
benchmark framework. Later in the policy experiment, a pay-as-you-go social security system
is introduced.
3.4 Housing, Tenure Choice and Borrowing Constraint
Every period, households decide to become a renter or a homeowner. A renter has the option
to continue renting or to buy a house and become a homeowner. If the renter decides to rent
in the next period (t + 1), a rental deposit µptht+1 is paid upfront, which is a fraction µ of the
market value of the property. In the beginning of the next period, the renter receives the exact
nominal amount back. This rent deposit is part of the renter's ¯nancial asset. On the other
hand, if the renter wants to become a homeowner, the renter can purchase a house valued at
ptht+1. This housing choice re°ects the existing rental arrangements in Korea under the chonsae
15system. Later, in the appendix, I show that the rental arrangements can be modi¯ed to model
the rental system in the United States.
A minimum value, H, is assumed for owner-occupied housing as introduced by Cocco (2004).
The constraint on minimum housing value is as follows:
ht ¸ ItH 8t: (5)
Owning a house serves a dual purpose of not only providing housing service °ow, but also allows
the household to hold home equity which provides risky returns in the next period as the housing
price °uctuates.
A homeowner, on the other hand, can decide whether to keep the house or to sell and
move. After selling the house, the homeowner faces the same choice as the renter; that is, the
homeowner can either choose to rent or buy another house. Due to the illiquid nature of the
housing investment, selling the house incurs a transaction (or liquidation) cost (Á) proportional
to the value of the house. In addition, the house can be used as collateral for homeowners to
borrow up to a fraction, ·, of the next period housing value. As such, · is the loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, and 1¡· is commonly known as the down payment ratio. The collateral constraint
is as follows:
at+1 ¸ ¡·ptht+1(It+1) 8t: (6)
In addition to the collateral constraint, there is an income constraint on borrowing, where
the per-period mortgage payment cannot exceed a fraction, Â, of the current period income.














Finally, in every period, the real price of housing, pt, appreciates at an average rate of rH
net of depreciation. Denoting ~ pt as the mean-deviated form of pt, it is assumed that ~ pH
t follows
an AR(1) process as follows:
~ pt = ½~ pt¡1 + ²rt 8t: (9)
The innovation term, ²rt, is iid normally distributed with a zero mean and variance of ¾2
²r.
163.5 Household Recursive Problem
The state space is a set X = fj;h;a;I;P;yg, where j is the age of the household, h is the stock
of housing, a is the ¯nancial net worth carried from the previous period, I is the tenure status
of the household in the current period, P is a vector consisting housing prices in the current
period and the previous period (P = [p;p¡1]), and y is income. Given the tenure status, a renter
decides whether to stay a renter or become a homeowner. On the other hand, a homeowner
decides ¯rst whether to keep the house or to sell and move, after which the homeowner faces the
same option as the renter. Incorporating this tenure decision, the value function for a household
is the maximum of three di®erent values, which depend on the tenure choice made in the next
period:
V (X) = max
©
V R(X);V K(X);V C(X)
ª
(10)
The functions V R, V K, and V C are, respectively, the value functions of a household that chooses
to rent in the next period, that chooses to keep the house next period, and that changes homes
in the next period. Note that for renters V K and V C coincide, as renters can only choose to
rent or buy a house.
3.5.1 Value Function of Renting Next Period: VR
In the beginning of the period t, working household receives labor income, y, and transfers,
tr, from the government, which equally redistributes the bequest it collects from the deceased.
The household receives either the nominal amount of rent deposit returned from the landlord,
µp¡1h, or receives the value of housing with returns net of depreciation and liquidation cost,
(1 ¡ Á)ph, depending on the housing status. Finally, the household carries the ¯nancial net
worth with realized riskfree returns, (1 + r)a. Thus, the available resources (or `cash-on-hand')
for the household that rents in the next period, WR, can be expressed as follows:




1 if j · 8
0 if 8 < j · 13
Here, Iw is an indicator function denoting the working and the transfer eligibility status.
Given the available resources, the household then chooses consumption of non-durable goods,
c, next period ¯nancial net worth, a0, and pays a rental deposit, µph0, which is a fraction µ of the
market value of the house. Renters are not allowed to borrow. In addition, the household faces
a positive probability of death, in which case the sum of the household's ¯nancial net worth
17and rental deposit are left in the next period as bequest, b. Finally, non-negativity conditions
hold for durable and non-durable goods consumption. The value function of the household that
chooses to rent in the next period is given as follows:
V R(j;h;a;I;P;y) = max
c;h0;a0
£




c + a0 + µph0 · WR (13)
a0; c; h0 ¸ 0
b = a0 + µph0
3.5.2 Value Function of Keeping the House Next Period: VK
In the beginning of the period t, working household receives labor income, y, and transfers, tr,
from the government, which equally redistributes the bequest it collects from the deceased. The
household receives either the nominal amount of rent deposit returned from the landlord, µp¡1h,
or the value of housing with returns net of depreciation, ph, without paying any transaction cost
since the household chooses to keep the house. The household also carries ¯nancial net worth
with realized riskfree returns, (1+r)a. The available resources for the household that keeps the
house at period t + 1, WK, is expressed as follows:
WK = Iwy + (1 ¡ I)µp¡1h + Iph + (1 + r)a + Iwtr (14)
Given the available resources, the household chooses consumption of non-durable goods, c, next
period ¯nancial net worth, a0, and next period housing stock, ph0. The household can borrow
up to · fraction of the value of the house in the next period. Minimum housing value constraint
holds, and for a homeowner, the choice of housing stock in the next period is equal to the
current period housing stock, since the household does not move (h0 = h). Upon retirement,
the household faces a positive probability of death, in which case the sum of the ¯nancial net
worth and housing assets in the next period are left as bequest, b. The recursive problem for
the household that chooses to keep the house in the next period is shown as follows:
V K(j;h;a;I;P;y) = max
c;h0;a0
£












h0 ¸ H ; Ih0 = Ih
b = a0 + ph0
3.5.3 Value Function of Changing the House Next Period: VC
The available resources for the household that changes the house in the next period t + 1, WC,
is identical to WR.
WC = Iwy + (1 ¡ I)µp¡1h + I(1 ¡ Á)ph + (1 + r)a + Iwtr (17)
Given the available resources, the household chooses consumption of non-durable goods, c, next
period ¯nancial net worth, a0, and next period housing stock, ph0. The household can borrow
up to · fraction of the value of the house in the next period. Minimum housing value constraint
holds. Upon retirement, the household faces a positive probability of death, in which case the
sum of the ¯nancial net worth and housing assets in the next period are left as bequest, b. The
recursive problem for the household that chooses to change the house in the next period is shown
as follows:
V C(j;h;a;I;P;y) = max
c;h0;a0
£













b = a0 + ph0
4 Calibration
The set of parameters will be divided into those that can be estimated independently of the
model or are based on estimates provided by other literature and the KLIPS data, and those
that are chosen such that the predictions generated by the model can match a given set of targets.
All parameters were adjusted to the ¯ve year span that each period in the model represents.
The calibrated parameters are shown in Table 3.
19Table 3. Parameter De¯nition and Values - Korea
Parameters De¯nition Value
° Risk-aversion coe±cient 1.5
! Share of housing consumption 0.25
¯ Discount factor 0.98
µ Rent-deposit ratio 0.6
¸ Rental utility ratio 0.65
Á Liquidation/transaction cost 0.03
· Loan-to-value ratio 0.25
Â Income constraint on mortgage payment 0.3
r Risk-free interest rate 4:1%
¹ rH Average housing price appreciation rate 4%
½r AR(1) parameter of housing price process 0.8
¾2
²r Innovation to housing price process 0.25
½y AR(1) parameter of income process 0.85
¾2
²y Innovation to income process 0.3
H Minimum housing value to income ratio 3.3
'1 Bequest parameter ¡20:0
'2 Bequest parameter 1:0
The labor income for households follows a deterministic age-dependent trend as well as
idiosyncratic shocks, with period t income for an agent aged j given as yjt = f(j)ºt. The
age-dependent deterministic income pro¯le, f(j), was calculated from the estimate of the mean
age-income pro¯le from the KLIPS data (1999-2002). The parameters ½y and ¾2
²y in the income
process were taken from Yang (2005).
The conditional survival probabilities for people aged less than 60 years was assumed to be 1.
For people aged 60 years and over, the probabilities were taken from the Korea Life Table (2001)
supplied by the National Statistical O±ce of Korea. The KLIPS data was used to calibrate the
average e®ective family size nt. For the adult equivalent scale, I adopted the measure used by
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2001).
The risk-free interest rate, r, was set at 4.1%, which was the average annual real interest
rate from 1986 to 2002. The logarithm of net housing returns net of depreciation is assumed
to be an AR(1) process with correlation coe±cient parameter ½ and variance ¾2. The average
gross housing return and the AR(1) parameters are estimated from the monthly housing price
index data provided by Kookmin Bank. I also assume that the correlation between shocks to the
income process and housing returns is zero. The depreciation rate of the housing stock is taken
to be 3 percent, and this results in the real return to housing net of depreciation at 4 percent.
For the transaction cost parameter, Á, Gruber and Martin (2003) estimate the reallocation cost
of tax and agency cost from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), and ¯nd that the
median household pays costs on the order of 7% to sell the house. In Korea, however, the average
agency cost stands around 1% of the property value. Incorporating other costs, I assume the
20transaction cost to be 3% of the property value in Korea.
The loan-to-value ratio, ·, was taken from the average of the loan-to-value ratio between the
years 1996 and 2000 compiled by the Housing and Commercial Bank in Korea. The parameter
for the income constraint, Â, was taken to be 0.3, which is a widely used ¯gure by the mortgage
lenders. The rent-deposit ratio, µ, was taken to be 0.6 which falls in the middle of 0.4 and
0.8, taken from the data. In Section 6, a sensitivity analysis is conducted on the rent-deposit
ratio, which shows that for both higher and lower values of rent-deposit ratios, the result is
robust. The rental utility parameter, ¸, is calibrated to be 0.60. The minimum housing value
is calibrated such that the average homeownership ratio in the benchmark simulation matches
the KLIPS data.
Regarding the preference parameters, the relative risk aversion coe±cient, °, is taken from
Attanasio et. al.(1999). The share of housing consumption, !, ranges from 0.15 (Chen) to 0.4
(Platania & Schlagenhauf) in the literature. The median value of 0.25 is used for the model.
Later, in the sensitivity analysis on the share of housing consumption, it is shown that the
results were not a®ected by the change in the value of !. The discount factor, ¯, is calibrated
to match the peak level of the net worth pro¯le.
For the bequest parameters, the amount of bequests left by each age group are estimated
using the survival probabilities and the wealth data, following the method proposed by Shimono,
Otsuki and Ishikawa (1999). Aggregating the amount of bequests over all ages, the annual °ow
of bequest to wealth ratio is found to be 0.46%13. The ¯gure is consistent with studies by
Horioka et. al (2000) showing that the bequest motives in East Asian countries are weaker than
in the United States. The bequest parameter, '1, is chosen so that the bequest to wealth ratio
matches the data. As for '2, which governs the degree to which bequests are considered luxury
goods, the value is chosen to match the variance of the estimated bequest.
5 Results and Policy Experiments
In this section, the results from the benchmark simulation are presented and the ¯t of the model
is evaluated. Next, the roles of the institutional factors, namely, the mortgage market and the
rental arrangements, are examined. Finally, using the benchmark simulation as a reference, a
policy experiment of introducing a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system is presented
and the implications on wealth accumulation and portfolio composition are analyzed. All other
parameters were kept unchanged at the same value as made under the benchmark simulation.
13Gale and Scholz (1994) estimate the annual °ow of bequest to be 0.88% of the aggregate net worth using the
1983 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances.
215.1 Benchmark Case
In the model, net worth is de¯ned as (1¡I)µp¡1h+Iph+(1+r)a+tr, which is the sum of the
housing asset and ¯nancial net worth plus any transfers received in the beginning of the period.
This series is plotted against net worth in the data. In addition, housing asset for homeowners,
Iph, is plotted against the housing asset in the data. For non-housing net worth, the sum of
rent deposit, other ¯nancial net worth, and transfers, (1 ¡ I)µp¡1h + (1 + r)a + tr, are plotted
against the sum of ¯nancial net worth and other non-¯nancial asset in the data. The results
































































































Figure 5.4 Homeownership Ratio
(Benchmark)
The benchmark simulation captures some features of the data while missing some other
aspects. These features can be summarized as follows:
² To begin with, Table 4 below compares the aggregate statistics of the benchmark economy
and the data.
Table 4. Aggregate Statistics for Benchmark Economy
Benchmark Economy KLIPS Data
Net Worth to Income Ratio 3.27 4.43
Housing Asset to Net Worth Ratio 0.63 0.58
Homeownership Ratio 0.62 0.60
22² The pro¯le of net worth in the benchmark simulation has a hump-shaped path over age,
and the peak of net worth pro¯le matches the the data fairly well. However, the timing at
which the peak occurs is at the ages of 60-65 in the simulation, which is around ten to ¯fteen
years later than the peak shown in the data. In addition, the simulation under-estimates
the aggregate net worth in the data, especially for working age groups. The simulation
can only generate 75% of the aggregate net worth in the data. Since the model focuses
on the average household, it does not generate su±cient heterogeneity and skewness in
wealth distribution. This might partly explain why the net worth to income ratio is lower
than the data.
² The pro¯le of the housing asset also matches the hump shaped pattern shown in the data,
and the peak of the pro¯le matches that of the data fairly well. Once the peak is reached
at the ages of 55-60, the level of the housing asset steadily declines. In addition, the pro¯le
of the housing asset is zero for households from ages 20 to 35 since the households all rent.
The model does not generate enough wealth for the younger households to a®ord their
own housing.
² Non-housing net worth in the simulation is also matches some of the lifecycle pattern
shown in the data. However, the pro¯le in the simulation is not as smooth as what is
shown in the data. In the model, the pro¯le of non-housing net worth ¯rst peaks in the
early thirties, as people save before buying a house. As households borrow to ¯nance their
housing purchase, non-housing net worth declines during the ages of late 30s and early 40s.
This period overlaps with the period in which households accumulate housing assets. Once
households become homeowners, they start accumulating ¯nancial assets again mostly to
¯nance consumption after retirement. In the data, however, the pro¯le of non-housing
net worth shows a hump-shaped pattern over the life cycle without any signi¯cant decline
before retirement.
² Homeownership ratio in the benchmark simulation follows a hump-shaped pattern over
the age groups and matches the average homeownership ratio in the data. However, it
shows a rapid overshooting during the late 30s and early 40s age group, as it jumps from
0 to around 75%. The model is thus unable to explain the positive homeownership ratio
of younger households in the data. Furthermore, under the benchmark simulation, all
households between ages 50 to 70 years are homeowners. In the age groups of 60 years or
higher, the homeownership ratio starts to drop, eventually reaching around 65% for the
terminal age group.
235.2 The Role of The Institutional Features
In this section, the quantitative roles played by the institutional features of the mortgage and
the rental market are analyzed. First, to highlight the role of mortgage system, the current
system was modi¯ed to resemble the mortgage system in the United States. In fact, the Korean
government recently introduced a full-°edged mortgage loan program similar to that in the
United States. Even though it is too early to assess the impact of this recent policy introduction,
modifying the model by incorporating mortgage loans may shed light on how households' tenure
decision will be a®ected, as well as the overall portfolio composition of wealth over the life cycle.
One way to incorporate mortgage into the model is to introduce an asset from which people
can borrow against. However, given the existing number of state variables, adding another
state variable would only complicate further the computation without providing many bene¯cial
implications. Thus, instead of adding another state variable, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is
changed to 70% from the benchmark ratio of 25%. This implies that households can now ¯nance
their home purchase with an upfront down-payment of only 30% of the value of the house.
It is also assumed that households with a mortgage can re¯nance and adjust their mortgage
balance without any adjustment cost. Relaxing the collateral constraint will enable households
to purchase a house earlier and accumulate more housing assets. Table 5 below compares the
aggregate statistics for the case when the mortgage system is expanded. The pro¯le of various
wealth and the pattern of homeownership under the alternative mortgage system are shown in
Figure 5.5 to 5.8.
Table 5. Aggregate Statistics for Alternative Mortgage System
Benchmark Alternative Mortgage
Net Worth to Income Ratio 3.27 3.16
Housing Asset to Net Worth Ratio 0.63 0.77


































































































Figure 5.8 Homeownership Ratio
(Mortgage)
² The aggregate net worth does not change signi¯cantly when the mortgage system is ex-
panded. The aggregate net worth to income ratio falls by 3.3%. Across di®erent age
groups, the level of net worth is lower for households that are starting to purchase hous-
ing. This corresponds to age groups 35-45 years.
² Households start accumulating housing assets earlier in the life cycle. Due to a more
relaxed collateral constraint and households' preference for owner-occupied housing over
renting, the housing asset to net worth ratio increases from 0.63 to 0.77.
² Non-housing net worth in the mortgage simulation peaks in the late twenties age group
and then dips into the negative range. The ¯rst peak of the non-housing net worth takes
place one model period earlier under the expanded mortgage. Households borrow more
and accumulate debt during the periods in which they start buying houses. From the
late forties, however, people start paying o® the mortgage debt and start accumulating
¯nancial assets.
² Relaxing the collateral constraint enables households to become homeowners earlier in the
life cycle than under the benchmark case. For age groups 30-35 years, 18% of households
are able to become homeowners through mortgage, compared to 0% under the benchmark
case. Also 75% of all households of ages 35-40 are homeowners, compared to around 20%
under the benchmark case. Homeownership increases signi¯cantly with the fraction of
homeowners in the economy increasing by approximately 11 percentage points under the
expanded mortgage system.
Next, to document the importance of the rental system, the rental arrangements in the
benchmark model was modi¯ed to mimic the rental system in the United States. Under the
alternative rental market arrangement, renters pay periodic rental payment, where the annual
rental cost is assumed to be a fraction ¹ of the house value. I choose three di®erent numerical
values of ¹ - 2%, 4%, and 6% - and examine the implications of changing the rental arrangement.
25The detailed set up of the alternative rental market arrangement is shown in the appendix. Table
6 below compares the aggregate statistics under the alternative rental market arrangement, while
the pro¯le of various wealth and the pattern of homeownership under the alternative rental
arrangements are shown in Figure 5.9 to 5.20.
Table 6. Aggregate Statistics for Alternative Rental Arrangement
Benchmark ¹ = 2% ¹ = 4% ¹ = 6%
Net Worth to Income Ratio 3.27 3.07 3.29 3.38
Housing Asset to Net Worth Ratio 0.63 0.59 0.63 0.68






























2% annual rental cost
Figure 5.9 Net Worth




























2% annual rental cost
Figure 5.10 Housing Asset



























2% annual rental cost
Figure 5.11 Non-housing Net W orth











2% annual rental cost
Figure 5.12 Homeownership Ratio






























4% annual rental cost
Figure 5.13 Net Worth



























4% annual rental cost
Figure 5.14 Housing Asset



























4% annual rental cost
Figure 5.15 Non-housing Net W orth











4% annual rental cost
Figure 5.16 Homeownership Ratio






























6% annual rental cost
Figure 5.17 Net W orth



























6% annual rental cost
Figure 5.18 Housing Asset



























6% annual rental cost
Figure 5.19 Non-housing Net W orth











6% annual rental cost
Figure 5.20 Homeownership Ratio
(Alternative Rent - 6%)
27² The aggregate net worth to income ratio falls by 9.4% when the annual rental cost is set
to be 2%, while it remains almost unchanged when the rental cost is 4% of the house
value. For higher rental cost of 6%, however, the aggregate net worth to income ratio
increases by approximately 3.3%. Lower wealth accumulation for lower rental cost re°ects
the decreased needs for savings in the earlier stage of life cycle geared towards housing
purchase.
² When the annual rental cost was set to be 2% of the house value, renting becomes relatively
cheaper in comparison to the benchmark case. This is shown in the two di®erent stages of
the life cycle. First, for households in the forties age group, the conversion from renting to
homeownership takes place more slowly than in the benchmark case as they delay home
purchase. Second, more retired households switch back to renters as they ¯nd renting a
cheaper alternative to homeownership. As a result, the overall homeownership ratio falls
by 7 percentage points. Due to lower homeownership, the fraction of wealth invested into
housing asset also decreases by 4 percentage points.
² On the other hand, for higher annual rental costs, renting becomes a more expensive option
for households as they start becoming homeowners earlier and stay as homeowners after
retirement. When the rental cost was set to be 6% of the house value, households start
becoming homeowners earlier. For age groups 35-40, 60% of households decide to become
homeowners, compared to 20% in the benchmark case. The overall homeownership ratio
rises by 7 percentage points, while the fraction of wealth invested into housing assets
increases by 5 percentage points.
Finally, when the mortgage system and the rental arrangement are jointly modi¯ed, the
e®ects on housing wealth and homeownership ratio are further ampli¯ed, whereas the e®ect on
the overall net worth becomes negative for all possible arrangements. Table 7 below compares
the aggregate statistics for the case when both the rental arrangement and the mortgage system
are altered. The pro¯le of various wealth and the pattern of homeownership under the alternative
mortgage and rental arrangement are shown in Figure 5.21 to 5.32.
Table 7. Aggregate Statistics under Alternative Mortgage and Rental Arrangement
Benchmark ¹ = 2% + ¹ = 4% + ¹ = 6% +
Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage
Net Worth to Income Ratio 3.27 2.96 3.13 3.20
Housing Asset to Net Worth Ratio 0.63 0.73 0.78 0.80































Figure 5.21 Net Worth




























Figure 5.22 Housing Asset





























Figure 5.23 Non-housing Net W orth












Figure 5.24 Homeownership Ratio































Figure 5.25 Net W orth




























Figure 5.26 Housing Asset





























Figure 5.27 Non-housing Net W orth












Figure 5.28 Homeownership Ratio































Figure 5.29 Net Worth




























Figure 5.30 Housing Asset





























Figure 5.31 Non-housing Net W orth












Figure 5.32 Homeownership Ratio
(Alternative Mortgage & Rent - 6%)
² The aggregate net worth to income ratio falls when alternative mortgage and rental ar-
rangements are jointly considered due to either wider availability of mortgage loans or
cheaper rental arrangements. For higher rental costs, the e®ect of mortgage expansion
dominates that of higher rental cost, thus lowering the overall level of savings in the econ-
omy. The aggregate net worth declines by 2.2% to 9.5%.
² Expanding mortgage system makes it easier for households to purchase housing, which
a®ects younger households more than older households. For all possible arrangements, the
homeownership of households of age groups 30-45 are all higher than the benchmark case,
regardless of the relative price of rental housing to owner-occupied housing.
² For all possible arrangements, the overall homeownership ratio increases, ranging from 4
percentage points to 15 percentage points increase. In addition, the overall housing asset
to net worth ratio increases for all possible housing market arrangements.
5.3 Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) Social Security Experiment
Finally, the impact of introducing a pay-as-you-go social security system is analyzed. Two
main motives for households to accumulate wealth over the life cycle are housing purchase and
30retirement. In the previous section, the impact of changes in the housing market on the pro¯le
of wealth and homeownership were examined. On the other hand, since it is hard to separate the
two saving motives, it would be interesting to see how the wealth portfolio and homeownership
decisions will be a®ected when the retirement arrangements are altered. To introduce social
security in the simplest manner, I assume that in each period working households from ages
20 to 55 years pay social security tax at a ¯xed rate, ¿. The government collects the tax and
distributes social security bene¯ts to the retirees at a constant replacement rate of $. The
social security payroll tax rate of 9% is taken from the Korean social security system, and the
implied replacement rate turns out to be 40%. Table 8 compares some aggregate properties of
the economy under the social security experiment with the benchmark economy. The results
from introducing a pay-as-you-go social security system are shown in Figure 5.33 to 5.36.
Table 8. Aggregate Statistics for Social Security Experiment
Benchmark Social Security
Net Worth to Income Ratio 3.27 2.92
Housing Asset to Net Worth Ratio 0.63 0.64

































































































Figure 5.36 Homeownership Ratio
(Social Security)
31² The magnitude of the hump in net worth over the life cycle becomes smaller with the peak
of the net worth pro¯le standing around 80% of the peak under the benchmark simulation.
Across di®erent age groups, the decline in the level of net worth starts becoming more
prominent for ages 45 years or higher, as households have weaker motives to save for
retirement in the presence of social security system. Aggregating over all age groups, the
net worth to income ratio falls by around 10.3%.
² Weakening the households' savings motive for retirement also has implications on the
accumulation of housing assets. Less wealth accumulation early in the life cycle implies
lower accumulation of housing assets at a reduced pace. Weaker need for savings to
¯nance consumption after retirement is also re°ected in the lower level of accumulation in
the non-housing net worth, as the peak of non-housing asset at the time of retirement is
approximately 60% of the level in the absence of social security system.
² The homeownership ratio increases at a slower pace than under the benchmark simula-
tion. For age groups 40-45 years, approximately 60% of households become homeowners,
compared to 75% under the benchmark case. Introduction of a social security system neg-
atively a®ects the homeownership, as the average homeownership ratio falls to 56% from
62% in the benchmark economy.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, the robustness of the main ¯ndings in the benchmark economy to the choice of
key parameters are scrutinized. First, the rent-deposit ratio, µ, is changed for the sensitivity
analysis. Next, the share of housing consumption ! is checked. Finally, the e®ect of changing the
coe±cient of relative risk aversion ° is rationalized. Other calibrated parameters are adjusted
accordingly to match the target variables in the data.
6.1 Rent-Deposit Ratio (µ)
In the data, the value of rental housing ranges from 40% to 80% of the purchasing value of
a house. In the benchmark, the median value was chosen. However, the actual value would
eventually depend on the supply and demand of the rental housing as opposed to owner-occupied
housing. Keeping this in mind, the e®ect of changing the rent-deposit ratio to a lower bound
of 40% and then to an upper bound of 80% on the pro¯le of net worth and other assets were
evaluated. A lower value of µ implies that renting is relatively cheaper than buying a house.
This will make younger and older households stay in rental housing, which lowers the overall
32homeownership ratio. For households aged 60 or above, the pro¯le of housing assets and the
homeownership ratio declines more rapidly than the benchmark case. The pro¯le of net worth
does not change signi¯cantly when the rent-deposit ratio is lowered to 40%. However, the pro¯le
is slightly lower for the retired households, which re°ects the fact that more households return
to renting. The results from changing µ to 40% are shown in Figure 6.1 to 6.4 in the Appendix.
On the other hand, when the value of µ is set at 80%, rental housing becomes relatively
more expensive. This makes it more attractive for the households to purchase housing earlier
in the life cycle and remain homeowners, as the de-cumulation of housing assets is slow after
retirement. The pro¯le of various wealth and homeownership re°ect this change in the relative
rental price. The evolution of the pro¯le of net worth is similar to the pro¯le in the benchmark
case. Figure 6.5 to 6.8 show the results when µ is changed to 80%.
6.2 Share of Housing Consumption (!)
The parameter ! determines the share of housing consumption. In the benchmark economy, !
was taken to be 0.25, as it represents a median value over the range used in the literature. The
pro¯le of various wealth and the pattern of homeownership is examined when ! is changed to
a value of 0.2 and 0.3, respectively. A lower share of housing consumption at 0.2 implies that
households spend more on non-durable consumption and less on housing consumption. This
implies that housing as an asset becomes less attractive for households. In fact, households hold
less wealth in the form of housing assets. Also the overall level of net worth declines slightly
for all age groups. Given the adjustment in the calibrated parameters, however, the pattern
of homeownership remained similar to the benchmark case. For retired households aged over
65 years, housing asset de-cumulates is faster and the homeownership declines more rapidly
than the benchmark case, as older households place less weight on housing consumption during
retirement. The results from changing ! to 0.2 are shown in Figure 6.9 to 6.12.
On the contrary, when ! is changed to 0.3, the opposite e®ect takes place. The pro¯le
of housing assets remains high even after retirement as households place more weight on the
consumption of housing goods. The overall pro¯les of net worth and ¯nancial net worth are
similar to those under the benchmark economy, as shown in Figure 6.13 to 6.16.
6.3 Relative Risk Aversion (°)
In this subsection, the robustness of the results are checked when the value of °, the relative risk
aversion parameter, is changed. Note that 1
° is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The
value of ° was increased from 1.5 to 2.5, lowering the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for
consumption. Thus, households become less willing to postpone consumption and therefore save
33less in the immediate sense. The pro¯le of net worth clearly veri¯es this e®ect as the level of
net worth is lower for households below the age of 45. The pro¯le of the housing assets shows a
more risk-averse pattern. Even though the purchase of housing remains unchanged, households
begin to sell their houses more quickly after retirement. The homeownership ratio also shows
similar trend, with households over the age 60 or above quickly reverting to renting. Higher
risk aversion to income and housing returns uncertainties make households hold more riskfree
¯nancial assets or stay as renters. Figure 6.17 to 6.20 show the results when ° is increased to
2.5.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, the wealth accumulation and asset portfolios of Korean households are investigated
by setting up a quantitative model calibrated to re°ect some key features of the Korean economy.
The unique institutional features of the Korean housing market are highlighted and their roles
are examined. The chonsae system, the unique rental arrangement in Korea, and the lack of
mortgage system in Korea do play a signi¯cant role in accounting for the observed features
of wealth accumulation and portfolio composition in Korea. Also, the various implications of
recent policy changes are analyzed, such as expanding the current mortgage loan system and
introducing social security system to the economy. An expansion of the mortgage system is
expected to increase the average homeownership ratio signi¯cantly, especially for households in
the 30-40 age group; whereas, introducing social security has the opposite e®ect. Expanding the
mortgage system also shifts households' wealth portfolio toward housing assets, while the social
security system does not a®ect the asset portfolio of households.
It is important to note that the model abstracts from several issues. Data shows signi¯cant
heterogeneity in households' wealth portfolios in terms of age and income. For example, the
richest households have a disproportionately large share of the total wealth. However, the model
presented in this paper does not allow for this di®erence, since it concentrates on the average
household. Incorporating models of wealth inequality may help shed light on these issues and
improve the model.
In addition, the model does not incorporate the existence of inter-vivos transfers, which
might explain why the model underestimates the level of wealth for the young households and
is unable to match the age at which the pro¯le of wealth peaks. In the data, Korean parents
provide large ¯nancial support to their children, especially when they become independent and
buy a house. Given the high down payment ratio, children either save for an extended period
of time or receive parental support in order to purchase a house. It is also reported that the
34average inter-vivos transfers received as a fraction of average income is higher in Korea than
in the United States, especially for the younger households. This strengthens the importance
of inter-vivos transfers in Korea and their implications on the accumulation of wealth over the
lifecycle. Incorporating inter-vivos transfers in explaining the pattern of wealth accumulation in
Korea raises several challenging questions for future research.
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38Appendix: Alternative Arrangement in the Rental Market
To capture the rental system in the United States, a periodic rent payment is introduced, where
renters pay a fraction ¹ of the market value of the house, as well as a security deposit, which
is equivalent to a one month rental payment (denoted as a fraction ¶ of the housing value).14 I
show the arrangement for the value function for the household that chooses to rent in the next
period. In the beginning of period s, the household receives labor income, y, and transfers, tr,
depending on the working status and bequest eligibility status, respectively. If the household
is a renter during this period, then the renter receives the security deposit, a fraction ¶ of the
house value, from the landlord. If the household is a homeowner, then the homeowner receives
the value of housing with returns net of depreciation and liquidation cost. The household also
receives the ¯nancial net worth with realized riskfree returns. The available resource for the
household that chooses to rent in next period is denoted as follows:
WR = Iwy + (1 ¡ I)¶ph + I(1 ¡ Á)ph + (1 + r)a + Iwtr
Given the available resources, the household then chooses consumption of non-durable goods,
c, ¯nancial net worth, a0, and pays periodic rental payment, ¹ph0, which is a fraction ¹ of the
house value. If a renter moves to another rental housing, then the renter needs to pay a security
deposit on the new rental housing, denoted as ¶ph0. If the renter decides to stay at the current
rental housing, then h0 = h and there is no need for additional security deposit. Renters are not
allowed to borrow. In addition, upon retirement, the household faces a positive probability of
death, in which case the sum of ¯nancial net worth and rental payment in the next period are
left as a bequest b. Finally, non-negativity conditions hold for durable and non-durable goods
consumption. The value function of the household that chooses to rent in the next period is
thus given as follows:
¹ V R(j;h;a;I;p;y) = max
c;h0;a0
£
U(c;h;n) + sj¯E(¹ V (j + 1;h0;a0;I0 = 0;p0;y0)) + (1 ¡ sj)'(b)
¤
subject to
c + a0 + ¹ph0 + ¶ph0 · WR
a0; c; h0 ¸ 0
b = a0 + (¹ + ¶)ph0
In the experiment, ¹, the annual rental cost, ranged from 2% to 6% of the value of the house.
The security deposit ratio ¶, is equivalent to a month rent payment, thus, 1
12th of the annual
rental cost.
14I thank Javier Fern¶ andez-Blanco for pointing this out.
39Appendix: Computation of the Model
Since there is no closed form solution to the model, the model is solved numerically to work out
optimal decision rules at di®erent ages as a function of the state variables (age, housing asset,
¯nancial net worth, housing status, housing returns, and income). The optimal decision rules
were found by backward induction, starting at period T and working all the way to the initial
period.
In period T, the value functions coincide with the sum of the period utility function and
the bequest function, and, given the realization of the state variables, the consumption and
bequest choice is trivial. Based on the period T policy functions, in every period prior to T, the
values associated with the di®erent choices of housing in the next period were calculated, and
consumption and asset portfolio choices conditional on di®erent housing choices were obtained
subsequently.
For choices of control variables that violate various constraints, a large negative utility is
given so that an optimizing household would never opt for these choices. The realization of
stochastic housing returns and shocks to income are approximated using a two-state Markov
process following Tauchen and Hussey (1991). Shocks to housing returns were the same for each
cohort, while shocks to income were idiosyncratic. The state space for housing and ¯nancial
assets were discretized into a ¯nite number of equally-spaced grid points. In the computation,
the number of points in the housing asset and ¯nancial net worth were 60 and 40, respectively.
Whenever the upper limit for the grids turned out to be binding in the solution to the
problem, the upper and lower bounds were increased and the problem was solved again. In the
end, the boundaries for the grids became su±ciently large and no longer imposed any constraint
on the optimization process. Having solved the model using the grid search method, a large
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Figure 6.20 Homeownership Ratio ( ° = 2:5)
43